Restoring America's Maritime Dominance

We're on the clock now

Last December, I gave a lecture for the Senator Margaret Chase Smith Library that is the basis for the naval history book I’m currently researching (and will return to in July after I submit my latest Connor Stark novel to my publisher.) The topic for the lecture (and the eventual book) is how the United States Navy was developed to fight and win the war in the Pacific and the factors the contributed to that victory. One factor is the Executive - in 1941 that meant the experienced President who had during World War I served as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy and was deeply interested in naval history and affairs throughout his life.

One factor with regard to presidential interest was in nominating and having the Senate confirm someone as Secretary of the Navy. The position was long diluted; originally a Cabinet-level position, it was downgraded as a result of the National Security Act of 1947 and the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act where jointness was prioritized over service-specific issues. Consequently, it didn’t matter how long the Navy was without a confirmed Secretary. That trend changed this year with the comparatively quick confirmation of John Phelan.

Another situation that has changed is the current administration announcements and apparent commitments to restore the US Navy and Merchant Marine to previous standards, particularly since China became the world’s largest navy.

This was the first indication of change, when President Trump addressed a joint session of Congress on March 6:

To boost our defense industrial base, we are also going to resurrect the American shipbuilding industry, including commercial shipbuilding and military shipbuilding.

And for that purpose, I am announcing tonight that we will create a new Office of Shipbuilding in the White House and offer special tax incentives to bring this industry home to America, where it belongs.

Yesterday, the president followed up with an Executive Order titled “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance.” Here are just a few pull quotes and my thoughts and questions:

Sec. 3. Maritime Action Plan. (a) Within 210 days of the date of this order, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the United States Trade Representative (USTR), and the heads of executive departments and agencies (agencies) the APNSA deems appropriate, shall submit a Maritime Action Plan (MAP) to the President, through the APNSA and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB Director) to achieve the policy set forth in this order.

This appears to be a whole of government (or most of government) approach which is encouraging. It’s not just a navy issue or a merchant service issue. The Navy has always been built because of dual-use shipyards (commercial and military) or those that could be completely converted in wartime as well as technologies sometimes available first in the private sector before it was adopted by the navy (like steam technology).

Sec. 4. Ensure the Security and Resilience of the Maritime Industrial Base. Within 180 days of the date of this order…provide to the APNSA and the OMB Director for inclusion in the MAP an assessment of options both for the use of available authorities and resources,

(a) identify key maritime components in the supply chain that are essential for rebuilding and expanding the Maritime Industrial Base and that should be prioritized for investment;
(b) ensure that their recommendations of public and private investments are made according to a clear metric

Good to see the word “metric” over other options. Data always tells us a story, not necessarily the story people or organizations want to tell (think certain Navy PAOs for the latter on messaging over facts.)

Sec. 7. Engage Allies and Partners to Align Trade Policies. Within 90 days of the date of this order…engage treaty allies, partners, and other like-minded countries around the world with respect to their potential imposition of any actions taken pursuant to sections 5 and 6 of this order.

This is one of the more challenging parts given recent policy statements and actions. I’ve now spoken to numerous friends and former colleagues internationally. Trust is built over time and can be destroyed is seconds. Will those allies and partners still want to work with us?

Sec. 8. Reduce Dependence on Adversaries through Allies and Partners. Within 90 days…recommend..all available incentives to help shipbuilders domiciled in allied nations partner to undertake capital investment in the United States to help strengthen the shipbuilding capacity of the United States.

This could be good. Other countries have shipyards that are more technologically-advanced or more innovative than the US. South Korea has advanced in large-scale shipbuilding, smart shipyards (compared to the U.S. lagging in digital shipyard integration), and delivery speed (compared to extraordinarily long lead times for naval contracts in the US), as well as cost competitiveness given (largely) U.S. labor and regulatory costs. A good report to review is a 2023 CRS report, “U.S. Commercial Shipbuilding in a Global Context”. But we might expect some resistance from US shipyard unless there are off-setting incentives. I could be wrong.

Sec. 11. Establish Maritime Prosperity Zones. Within 90 days of the date of this order…deliver a plan…that identifies opportunities to incentivize and facilitate domestic and allied investment in United States maritime industries and waterfront communities through establishment of maritime prosperity zones…

(c) provide for zones that are outside of traditional coastal shipbuilding and ship repair centers and are geographically diverse, including river regions as well as the Great Lakes.

I like this one namely because the U.S. lacks shipbuilding capacity. One major yard not far from my house has very little room to expand given that’s it on a river and everything around it is built up. But also we need to look at other kinds of shipyards, something the Office of Naval Research did when it built FSF-1 Sea Fighter (aka X-Craft) at Nichols Brothers Boat Builders in record time - that record time, by the way, almost didn’t happen. Why? Because of constant engineering changes through the early construction process. The Chief of Naval Research killed those changes and the ship was back on schedule.

I also like the geographical diversity of this section. In fact, Mark Tempest and I wrote about it in 2016 as advice for the incoming President:

To eliminate these short-term challenges the new administration could increase the size of the naval force to meet its goals with smaller vessels whose purpose is the myriad of low-intensity operations. Simultaneously, it could pursue long-term design, contracting, and construction of larger combatants. This could be accomplished with already-proven and available boatyards in a wide range of states in the south, east, Great Lakes and even along the Ohio and Mississippi rivers.

Back to the Executive Order:

Sec. 13. Expand Mariner Training and Education. Within 90 days of the date of this order…deliver a report…recommendations to address workforce challenges in the maritime sector through maritime educational institutions and workforce transitions.

Again, a good but difficult especially given the current workforce challenges already identified. Shipyards are facing significant shortages of tradespeople like welders, pipefitters, etc. The problem is going to be much worse in the next few years with retirements and the fact that in some places, it’s just more difficult to correct it. Maine, for example, has two shipyards in a state that has the highest median age. In addition, both yards are on the coast where home values and property are too high for tradespeople because of the influx of out-of-staters who had the cash to plunk down for properties so the tradespeople have to commute about 45-60 minutes. Any effort needs to address that challenge. Unfortunately, an organization was established a year or so ago to do that but has largely failed due to its leadership whose lack of expertise and rice bowl mentality (among other issues) are not expected to yield significant positive results.

Sec. 14. Modernize the United States Merchant Marine Academy…within 30 days of this order..hire the necessary facilities staff and reprogram budgetary resources needed to execute urgent deferred maintenance projects and any other mission critical repair works at the USMMA

That’s a good. I’d also like to see USMMA data on its graduates - the percentage that went into the merchant marine, those that went USN, and those who went to other industries.

Sec. 15. Improve Procurement Efficiency. Within 90 days of the date of this order…develop a proposal for improved acquisition strategies processes for United States Government vessels

It’s tough to find any criticism with this. But we’ve also been arguing this literally for decades. I’m old enough to have worked as a contractor for NAVSEA when SECDEF William Perry’s Acquisition Reform Initiative that included: use of Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) technology, reduction of MILSPECs, have a philosophy of build “cheaper, better, faster,” emphasize performance-based contracting, allowed DoD to enter into agreements outside of traditional Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) rules. How did those work out? I’m sure Ron O’Rourke at CRS or some other defense analyst has written on its legacy. But I’m a historian at heart. What did we learning - if anything - from that? More important, if the administration achieves a new procurement strategy that works, how does it intend to keep it in place in the future?

Sec. 16. Improve Government Efficiency. Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Department of Government Efficiency shall begin a separate review of the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security vessel procurement processes and deliver a proposal to the President

There are a lot of criticisms of Musk, but given his successful design and construction in space programs this is an area where he has real credibility. Not all naval or maritime missions require high end ships (especially merchant ships.)

Sec. 17. Increase the Fleet of Commercial Vessels Trading Internationally under the flag of the United States. Within 180 days of the date of this order…
(i) grow the fleet of United States built, crewed, and flagged vessels that serve as readily deployable assets for national security purposes

Like tradespeople, the tough part will be to crew these ships with US citizens (if that’s the intent.) We need to identify populations or maybe create a program akin to William F. Buckley’s National Service proposal to built a baseline workforce.

Sec. 19. Shipbuilding Review. Within 45 days of the date of this order…conduct a review of shipbuilding for United States Government use and submit a report to the President with recommendations to increase the number of participants and competitors within United States shipbuilding, an

That should be easy enough…if the authors are really looking beyond the traditional shipbuilding base.

Sec. 21. Inactive Reserve Fleet. Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Defense shall conduct a review and issue guidance on the funding, retention, support, and mobilization of a robust inactive reserve fleet.

This section would require significant effort by contractors but the Navy has a near-ready built force or mechanism for this - the US Navy Reserve. Reservists, long before I commissioned, used to conduct this work for ships as well as aircraft such as a reserve P-3 unit in the old Brunswick NAS. Part of that study should be conducted by the nominated Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs or if a DASN for Reserve Affairs is nominated. Take the current force and modify from a Cold War model that was used in Iraq and Afghanistan but could support the active component through readying an inactive reserve fleet alongside contractors or civil service at the yards. I wrote about this several years ago. Take out half of my old intelligence community and convert those to SWO-lite billets if needed. It’s not impossible (I only say this since as an intel officer I earned my OOD/Underway letter for a major surface combatant and Craftmaster for Yard Patrol training vessels and crawled around a lot of decommissioned ships for two of my reserve billets over the years and ships/yards for another job). And if I could do it, anyone can.)

If you’re keeping score, here’s what this executive order’s timeline looks like:

To put it in a chronological order:

Two caveats to the above:

1. These are only reports, not actions.

2. We saw what happened before with the hopeful “National Commission on the Future of the Navy” authorized by Congress in FY23 and eventually included outstanding members. But nominations were delayed, and target dates well beyond…so beyond that I think we’re close to two years past the original target date of the report, not due to the members, but because of the process and lack of some congressional commitment.

What I hope for is the success of this Executive Order.

What I dread:

My gut, however, tells me that we’ll actually see some progress on this.